The Real Story Behind BPI Internal System Glitch Exposed

On 06 June, 2017 the Philippine Star reported and we quote, “Members of the of the 7th Marine Battalion recovered P52 million in cash, P27 million worth of checks and firearms in a house in Marawi City following its clearing operations against the Maute terror group. The money was found Friday, 05 June 2017 in a house in Saduc area in Marawi City, where members of the Maute group showed force early on. The Armed Forces of the Philippines said that the amount of recovered money and firearms indicate that the ISIS-inspired group is well-equipped and well-funded.”

marines-recover-money-marawi.jpg

Two days after the recovery of the said sum of money, 07 June 2017, BPI released an official statement announcing the Internal System Error and we quote, “We have identified an internal system error that caused some transactions occurring between April 27 and May 2 to be double-posted as of June 6,” declared the official statement of the bank issued on Wednesday, June 7.

On the bank’s official website, a series of advisories were posted announcing the deactivation of electronic channels and on 07 June 2017 we quote, “Our electronic channels will remain temporarily closed to speed up resolution, but we continue to anticipate complete resolution within today.” And also on 08 June 2017 we quote, “To allow us to do the necessary adjustments, we will need to de-activate our electronic channels today.”

And on 07 June 2017 also BPI posted and we quote, “Further to our announcement this morning, we have identified an internal system error that caused some transactions occurring between April 27 and May 2 to be double-posted as of June 6.” They identified the error but it took them days to resolve the problem?

The conspiracy link. 

On 29 April 2016, on ABS-CBS Halalan 2016 website and we quote, “Citing bank transaction records from several sources, Trillanes said that millions of pesos were funneled into the 17 accounts of the Davao city mayor (Duterte) in three banks, from 2006 to 2015.” And so we thought, Trillanes must have someone from BPI that allowed him to get access to these accounts.

Our hypothesis.

With the millions in cash and checks recovered from the Maute Group, which according to AFP a well-equipped and well-funded ISIS-inspired group, tantamounts to the destabilization efforts of the group who are against the President? We really thought an investigation of BPI Internal System Error is required.

On 09 June 2017, the Inquirer.net reported and we quote, “Three party-list lawmakers filed a resolution seeking a House of Representatives inquiry in aid of legislation on the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) technical glitch that caused some bank accounts holders to see their savings increase or reduced, an incident that was ruled out as an internal systems error.”

Is the money recovered from Maute encashed and came from BPI thru the efforts of Duterte destabilizers prompting BPI to announced a glitch to correct and cover the issue? What do you think? You be the judge. Hit Like and don’t forget to Share.

Photo credit to Philippine Star.

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5 thoughts on “The Real Story Behind BPI Internal System Glitch Exposed

  1. I’m going to eventually respond to this in my site, but let me start off my saying that your hypothesis is too far-fetched. For one, the BPI incident points to human error (this thinking is shared by many IT expert practitioners) and two, to execute such a scheme would require the cooperation of several accomplices, all of which could easily spill the beans.

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    1. Given it’s a mere IT glitch (human error as you said), how would you argue the fact that if those errors occurred on those specific dates (April 27 to May 2) and discovered the issue on June 07, 2017, aren’t it supposed to continue on the succeeding days? What happened to the transactions occurred between May 3 – June 7? They’re completely fine while error code is still in the system? What’s so special about April 27 to May 2 transactions? Hmm… the siege happened on the 23rd of May. Payment beforehand, maybe?

      Okay programmer error, if you really know the problem and IDENTIFIED the specific part of the code that was defective, rerunning the code to fix the problem, would not take TWO days.

      We’ll, Ill give you a different scenario, what if you know the problem, but you didn’t know the solution, does it sounds conspiracy now? Does the two days worth it now?

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      1. First of all, the error did not happen between April 27-May 2. The error happened on June 7. The most probable explanation is that a file or files were mistakenly uploaded to their core bank system possibly by some newbie operator or some exhausted administrator, resulting in double posting.

        By the way, double posting is not uncommon.

        Why April 27 to May 2? One way to explain is that the file contained all transactions from April 27. The double posting was mistakenly initiated and by the time the mistake was discovered and the process halted, all transactions from April 27 to May 2 were posted.

        Why did it take 2 days to fix? Because the challenge now is to reverse the entries and even possibly to correct the accumulated interest accrual and the computation of average monthly balance. Then it has to be tested. I could imagine all the controls and reviews being done because the worst thing to happen is for the fix to make things worse.

        Lastly, and this is why the conspiracy theory falls flat, for it to fund some “siege” requires an outward transaction. How will the money be siphoned out? Deposit to another bank account is traceable. SWIFT transactions require approval. An outward transaction will be flagged. And why debit thousands of accounts when you could just debit the bank’s main general ledger account?

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  2. From presumptions to another presumptions, your probable explanations are just all presumptions and it does not prove anything. I could only wish that by this time, you’ve realized an investigation is required.

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